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Bellsouth v. Cobb County and the
9-1-1 Act: Taxation Without a Right
of Action*
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Georgia has long recognized the importance of providing
emergency services for its citizens. The on-call availability of medical
services in our communities is a vital resource for those in need. The
Georgia Legislature enacted the Emergency Telephone Number “911”
Service Act of 1977 (9-1-1 Act or Act),1 which streamlined the
emergency services phone number into a single, three-digit emergency
number that would effectively reduce response time. 2 Specifically, the
Georgia General Assembly was concerned with the existence of too
many phone numbers for emergency services throughout the state. 3 In
2005, the Georgia General Assembly amended the Act that generated a
comprehensive plan that funds counties’ and local governments’
emergency services.4 The new, uniform, state–wide system placed a
duty on service providers to bill, collect, and remit funds to local
municipalities in order to provide reliable emergency services to
*I would first like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Monica Roudil, for assisting
me throughout the drafting stages and providing valuable comments and critiques. It was
Professor Roudil’s Income Tax course that inspired me to research an area of law that was
foreign to me at the time. However, as I learned of its complexity, I grew to appreciate it
all the more. I also want to thank my family and my fiancé, Abby Crouch, for their
constant support and encouragement.
1. Ga. S. Bill 134, Reg. Sess., 1977 Ga. Laws 1040.
2. Id. § 2.
3. The language of Section 2 displays the legislative intent: “There currently exist
numerous different emergency phone numbers throughout the State. Provision for a
single, primary three-digit emergency number through which emergency services can be
quickly and efficiently obtained would provide a significant contribution to law
enforcement and other public service efforts . . . .”
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 470, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 660 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-120 to -138 (2005)). O.C.G.A. § 46-5-121(b) states, “It is also in the public
interest that users of wireless telephones should bear some of the cost of providing this
life-saving service, as users of landline telephones currently do.”
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Georgia citizens.5 Essentially, the service providers would charge one’s
account on a monthly basis under the statute. 6 Upon collection of the
funds, the service providers would remit the money to the local
governments to offset their costs of providing emergency services.7 Until
recently, there has been no litigation concerning the Act.
In 2010, The Georgia Court of Appeals in Fulton County v. T-Mobile
South, LLC 8 first addressed the 9-1-1 charge under the Act.9 The court
wrangled in Georgia case law as well as other persuasive authority to
precisely attack the issue. Dissecting the main factors discussed in the
case, the court ultimately concluded that the charge under the Act was
a tax.10 The T-Mobile opinion is a raw depiction of the court scuffling
with the case of first impression. As a result, the T-Mobile decision built
a platform for other courts, including the Georgia Supreme Court, to
stand on when faced with the challenging issues of taxation and
statutory schemes.
On February 18, 2019, Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb
County11 was decided by the Georgia Supreme Court.12 The court
reversed the court of appeals and the trial court, holding that the
charge under the act is a tax and that Gwinnett and Cobb Counties (the
Counties) did not have a right of action against the service providers. 13
Because the charge was ruled a tax, the Counties were barred from
pursuing any common law remedies for negligence, fraud, or breach of
5. O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134(a)–(b) describes the billing and collection process.
6. Specifically, under O.C.G.A. § 46-5-122(17) a telephone subscriber is “a person or
entity to whom local exchange telephone service or wireless service, either residential or
commercial, is provided and in return for which the person or entity is billed on a monthly
basis.” Further, O.C.G.A. § 46-5-122(11) defines “911 charge” as,
a contribution to the local government for the 9-1-1 service start-up equipment
costs, subscriber notification costs, addressing costs, billing costs, nonrecurring
and recurring installation, maintenance, service, and network charges of a
service supplier providing 9-1-1 service pursuant to this part, and costs
associated with the hiring, training, and compensating of dispatchers employed
by the local governments to operate said 9-1-1 system at the public safety
answering points.
This shows who is liable (telephone subscribers) and what the costs are funding under the
statute. Id.
7. O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134(f)(1)–(8) lists the specific items in which the local
municipalities are authorized to use the money received from the Emergency Telephone
System Fund.
8. 305 Ga. App. 466 (2010).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 305 Ga. 144 (2019).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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fiduciary duty.14 Interestingly, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on
many of the cases cited in the T-Mobile decision,15 continuing to
construct a stronger framework regarding the taxation issue under the
Act.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Gwinnett and Cobb Counties brought their suit against Bellsouth
Telecommunications, LLC and Earthlink, Inc., Earthlink, LLC,
Deltacom, LLC, and Business Telecomm, LLC (“the telephone
companies”).16 The Counties alleged that the telephone companies did
not bill, and therefore not collect, enough 9-1-1 charges under the
statute.17 Specifically, the Counties alleged that the defendants did not
charge two classes of customers, estimating damages of more than
$38.9 million.18 Further, the Counties alleged in their complaints that
they should have been able to recover the funds through common law
theories of recovery (breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence)
even though the Act did not explicitly state a recovery action directly
against the service providers.19 The telephone companies argue that the
9-1-1 charge under the act is a tax and that the Counties are precluded
from collecting the money.20
At trial, the telephone companies moved to dismiss the complaints
for two reasons. First, the companies argued that the Counties did not
have a right to enforce a collection action against the service providers
because it was not expressly stated in the statute. Secondly, the
companies argued that the charge under the 9-1-1 Act is a tax,
distinguished from a fee, and thus, the Counties were barred from
pursuing any claim under common law remedies. The trial court denied
the motion and concluded that the charge is a fee, not a tax. Further,
the trial court found that the Counties had an implied right of action
when the statute was read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. § 51-1-621 and
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-8,22 meaning the Counties could pursue their claim. 23
14. Id. at 155.
15. Id. at 146–50.
16. Id. at 145.
17. Id. More precisely, the Counties allege that the telephone companies failed to bill
two categories of people: (1) customers that purchased plans capable of “carrying multiple
simultaneous calls over a single physical line” and (2) “Voice Over Internet Protocol”
customers. Id. at 145 n. 5.
18. Id. at 145.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 144.
21. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 (2019) provides, “When the law requires a person to perform an
act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another,
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Upon interlocutory review, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that
the trial court erred by finding that the Act furnished an implied right
of action for violating the statute. 24 However, the court of appeals ruled
that the Counties were still allowed to pursue their claim against the
service providers under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-8 for
violating the 9-1-1 Act.25 The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s
ruling regarding the charge not being defined as a tax, and remanded
for further consideration on the issue.26
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
charge under the Act was a fee or a tax, and whether the Counties could
pursue common law remedies or an implied right of action, depending
on the court’s answer to the former issue.27 The court concluded that the
charge was in fact a tax.28 Moreover, the court concluded that the 9-1-1
Act did not give the Counties a right of action to pursue a collection
action against the telephone companies.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of the 9-1-1 Act Litigation and T-Mobile: Case of First
Impression
In 1977, the General Assembly passed the Emergency Telephone
Number 9-1-1 Service Act, which established “a cohesive state–wide
emergency telephone number 9-1-1 system that [] provide[d] citizens
with rapid, direct access to public safety agencies by dialing telephone
number 9-1-1.”30 This Act allows local governments to offset the costs of
the 9-1-1 services it provides by “impos[ing] a monthly 9-1-1 charge
upon each telephone service.”31 The 9-1-1 Act defines “telephone
although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for
the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damages thereby.”
22. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-8 (2019) provides, “Private duties may arise from statute or from
relations created by contract, express or implied. The violation of a private duty,
accompanied by damage, shall give a right of action.”
23. Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 145.
24. Id. at 146 (citing Bellsouth Telecomms., 342 Ga. App. 323, 326–28).
25. Id. at 146 (citing Bellsouth Telecomms., 342 Ga. App. 323, 328–31).
26. Id. at 146 (citing Bellsouth Telecomms., 342 Ga. App. 323, 330–33).
27. Id. at 146.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC, 342 Ga. App. at 324; see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-121(a)
(2019).
31. Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC, 342 Ga. App. at 324; see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-133(a)
(2019).
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service” as “any method by which a 9-1-1 emergency call is delivered to
a public safety answering point.”32
The 9-1-1 Act requires telephone users to pay a monthly charge to
the companies (acting as the intermediary in the statutory scheme) in
which the telephone companies remit the charges to local governments
that operate 9-1-1 centers and dispatch services.33 At the time this suit
was filed, customers could be billed for the 9-1-1 charge at a maximum
of $1.50 for each subscription per telephone service provided. 34
Specifically, the Act states:
Each service supplier shall, on behalf of the local government, collect
the 9-1-1 charge from those telephone subscribers to whom it
provides telephone service in the area served by the emergency 9-1-1
system. As part of its normal billing process, the service supplier
shall collect the 9-1-1 charge for each month a telephone service is in
service, and it shall list the 9-1-1 charge as a separate entry on each
bill.35

Even though the 9-1-1 Act was enacted in 1977, very few cases have
addressed issues distinguishing taxes and fees during the legislation’s
tenure. However, the case of first impression, Fulton County v. T-Mobile
South, LLC,36 laid out the court of appeals’s rationale and set up a
foundation for future cases involving the 9-1-1 Act.
In T-Mobile, the same statutory scheme was in play involving three
parties: telephone subscribers, service providers, and the local
government.37 The Act defined “telephone subscriber” as “a person or
entity to whom local exchange telephone service or wireless service . . .
is provided and in return for which the person or entity is billed on a
monthly basis.”38 The “service supplier” collects the 9-1-1 charge and
remits the money to the local government.39 In this case, however,
T-Mobile did not bill those who purchase the “prepaid” wireless service
monthly, because those individuals pay for all their minutes upfront.40
32.
(2019).
33.
(2019).
34.
(2019).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC, 342 Ga. App. at 324; see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-122(16.1)
Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC, 342 Ga. App. at 323; see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134(a), (b)
Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC, 342 Ga. App. at 324; see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134(a)(1)(A)
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134(a)(1)(B) (2019).
305 Ga. App. 466 (2010).
Id. at 466–67.
O.C.G.A § 46-5-122(10) (1999).
T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 467.
Id.

[7] TAXATIONCASENOTE FINAL - CP (DO NOT DELETE)

682

MERCER LAW REVIEW

3/11/2020 10:36 AM

[Vol. 71

Therefore, T-Mobile did not need to distribute the 9-1-1 charges for the
“prepaid” customers. T-Mobile paid $101,618.66 on behalf of the prepaid
customers during the refund period out of their own pocket.
Consequently, T-Mobile filed a claim for a refund arguing that the 9-1-1
charges were taxes.41 The pivotal issue in the case was whether the
charges under the 9-1-1 Act are classified as a tax under Georgia law. 42
B. Analyzing Georgia Supreme Court Case Law
Understanding that this issue was a question of first impression, the
Georgia Court of Appeals relied on Georgia Supreme Court precedent
and analyzed primary mandatory authority.43 The court first analyzed
Gunby v. Yates,44 which involved the allocation of charges on marriage
licenses.45 In Gunby, the Ordinary of Catoosa County, Harold Yates,
allegedly sold 2,760 marriage licenses and failed to remit the $1.00
charge for each marriage license sold as required by the statute at
issue.46 The court in Gunby defined a “tax” as “an enforced contribution
exacted pursuant to legislative authority for the purpose of raising
revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes, and not as
payment for a special privilege or a service rendered.” 47 Contrastingly, a
“fee” was defined as “a charge fixed by law as compensation” for
services rendered.48 The court in Gunby held that, “the collection of this
[money] was not for the purpose of compensating . . . for a service
rendered, but was for the purpose of raising revenue for the expenses of
operating the retirement board and paying benefits . . . , and it is
therefore a tax and not a fee.”49
The court in T-Mobile next analyzed Luke v. Department of Natural
Resources,50 which considered whether the charges for participation in
the Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund (Fund) 51 constituted a tax.52
The court in Luke, relying on Gunby, concluded that—because the
owner or operator may participate in the fund (meaning participation is

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 469–73.
214 Ga. 17 (1958).
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 469.
Gunby, 214 Ga. at 20.
270 Ga. 647 (1999).
O.C.G.A. § § 12-13-2(c) (1999).
Luke, 270 Ga. at 648.
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voluntary)—the charge under the statute is a fee and not a tax.53 The
court reasoned by stating, “A tax is not dependent on the will or assent
of the person taxed,”54 rather it is an “enforced contribution, exacted
pursuant to legislative authority.”55
Levetan v. Lanier Worldwide56 was the third case the T-Mobile court
examined.57 In Levetan, the court had to consider whether sanitation
assessments for garbage collection constituted a tax or a fee charged for
services provided.58 The court in Levetan relied on City of Covington v.
Newton County,59 establishing that “counties that choose to provide
services for garbage collection and disposal may fix reasonable charges
and fees for the service.”60 Furthermore, the sanitation assessments at
issue were found to not be taxes within the meaning of the Georgia
Constitution, but rather charges for services rendered by the
municipality.61
Finally, McCleod v. Columbia County62 was analyzed by the court in
T-Mobile.63 McLeod involved a monthly stormwater utility charge. 64
Four owners of like property brought a suit against the county arguing
that the utility charge was unconstitutional.65 The plaintiffs’ argument
was that the utility charge was a tax, thus it must be applied uniformly
and proportionally under the Georgia Constitution. 66 The court
acknowledged, “Although it is often important to decide whether a
particular charge is a tax or a fee, it is frequently difficult to discern
whether a given enactment provides for a regulatory fee or authorizes
simply a tax.”67 The court ultimately relied on the reasoning in Gunby
and Luke and highlighted key factors that led to the court’s conclusion:
the voluntariness of the charge; whether the properties charged
received a special benefit; and the fact that the charge was not imposed

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 648.
Id. (citing 71 AM. JUR. 2d State and Local Taxation § 2, p. 344 (2019)).
Id. (quoting 84 C.J.S. Taxation §1, p.32 (2019)).
265 Ga. 323 (1995).
T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 470.
Id.
243 Ga. 476 (1979).
Levetan, 265 Ga. at 324.
Id.
278 Ga. 242 (2004).
T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 470.
Id.
McLeod, 278 Ga. at 242.
Id. at 243; see GA. CONST. art. VII, § I, para. 3.
Id. at 244 (quoting Hadley v. City of Atlanta, 232 Ga. App. 871, 872 (1998)).
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on those who owned undeveloped property.68 The court held that the
utility charge was a fee and not a tax.69
C. Persuasive Authority Examined in T-Mobile
In order to gain a better understanding of the 9-1-1 Act’s
implications, the court in T-Mobile looked to a few cases in other states
with more relevant facts than those presented in the Georgia cases.
Kessler v. Hevesi70 was the first source of persuasive authority for the
court.71 Specifically, the court in T-Mobile was interested in how the
court in Kessler analyzed the “public benefit” factor to the facts
presented. In Kessler, the court was faced with deciding whether a
monthly surcharge on wireless phones for enhanced 9-1-1 services is a
tax or a fee.72 The court concluded that “the surcharge . . . pays for
services received by, and for the benefit of, the general public. The
benefits flow to the general public because everyone—not just wireless
telephone users—benefits from the enhancement to 911 service.” 73
Comparably, a California court wrestled with a 9-1-1 charge similar
to that of the Act addressed in T-Mobile and Bellsouth.74 In Bay Area
Cellular Telephone Co. v. City of Union City,75 the court reasoned that
the charge implemented “is not charged for the use of the 911 system,
but for access to the system, whether or not a resident ever places an
emergency call.”76 The reasoning from Kessler and Bay Area show that
the public at large is benefitted from the tax, regardless if one is being
assisted by emergency services regularly or calling 9-1-1 on a regular
basis. Because the charge is uniformly applied to everyone who
subscribes to a service provider, it is a tax. If the charge only applied to
those who called 9-1-1, then the charge would simply be a fee for
services rendered.
D. Main Takeaways from T-Mobile
After the legal framework was laid out, the court then applied the
factors and rationale from the above decisions to come to a conclusion:

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 470.
McLeod, 278 Ga. at 244–45.
846 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 472 n. 37.
Hevesi, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
Id.
T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 472.
162 Cal. App. 4th 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 696.
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the 9-1-1 charge is a tax.77 Quoting Gunby, the court emphasized and
reiterated the definition of a tax: “an enforced contribution exacted
pursuant to legislative authority.”78 Here, the charge under the Act was
not voluntary and it was “exacted” in accordance with the statute. 79
Next, the court considered whether the revenue raised under the Act
was used for the general public benefit, rather than payment for a
service rendered.80 The purpose of the Act clearly offered evidence
showing that its purpose was to raise revenue for public or
governmental purposes.81 The General Assembly’s intent was:
to establish and implement a cohesive state–wide emergency
telephone number 9-1-1 system which will provide citizens with
rapid, direct access to public safety agencies by dialing telephone
number 9-1-1 with the objective of reducing the response time to
situations requiring law enforcement, fire, medical, rescue, and other
emergency services.82

Interestingly, the charges under the Act are defined as “contributions
to the local government” that help offset the costs of running,
maintaining, and providing an effective emergency system. 83 The court
viewed this as evidence of funding the government to assist emergency
systems rather than compensation for services rendered.84
Furthermore, the court considered whether those who are charged
under the Act received a benefit not received by others. 85 Distinguishing
the facts and holdings presented in McLeod and Levetan, the court
concluded that the individuals in McLeod and Levetan received benefits
that others did not receive.86 Here, the people who pay the charge under
the act receive no benefit because all members of the general public can
access the 9-1-1 system.87
Finally, to conclude the court’s analysis on whether the charge under
the 9-1-1 Act was a tax, the court looked at the United States

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

T-Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 470.
Id. (quoting Gunby, 214 Ga. at 19).
Id.
Id. at 470–71.
Id. at 471.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 46-5-121(a) (2019)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 46-5-122(11) (2019)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Comptroller General’s ruling regarding the 9-1-1 charge under the
Act.88 The opinion stated:
[t]he monthly charge is adopted by a resolution of the local
government and applies to every billed telephone subscriber, without
regard to level of service. The [9-1-1] charge raises money that is
spent to provide rapid, direct access to public safety agencies for the
benefit of the entire community.89

It is important to understand the legal backdrop that Georgia courts
have faced regarding the 9-1-1 Act. The same factors and rationale are
applied in the Bellsouth case. There has not been another case with the
same facts involving the 9-1-1 Act between the T-Mobile and Bellsouth
decisions. For the first time, the Supreme Court of Georgia got to weigh
in on the 9-1-1 Act since it was passed in 1977.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
A. Defining “Tax” and Distinguishing “Fee”
The court in Bellsouth started its analysis quoting Gunby, by
providing the definition of a tax: “A tax is an enforced contribution
exacted pursuant to legislative authority for the purpose of raising
revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes, and not as
payment for special privilege or a service rendered.”90 The court
explained that there are typically four criteria to consider when
deciding whether a charge is a tax:
(1) a means for the government to raise general revenue based on the
payer’s ability to pay without regard to direct benefits that may inure
to the payer or to the property taxed; (2) mandatory; (3) not related to
the payer’s contribution to the burden on government; and (4) not
resulting in a “special benefit” to the payer from those to whom the
charge does not apply.91

Contrastingly, a fee is “a charge for a particular service provided
based on the payer’s contribution to the problem.” 92 The court, applying

88. Id. at 472.
89. Id. (quoting Natl. Weather Syc. Ga. 911 Charge. B-301126, 2003 U.S. Comp. Gen.
LEXIS 231, 2003 WL 22416497 (Comp. Gen. 2003)).
90. Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 146 (quoting Gunby, 214 Ga. at 19).
91. Id. at 146–47; see McLeod, 278 Ga. at 244–45; see also Homewood Village, LLC v.
Unified Gov’t of Athens–Clarke County, 292 Ga. 514, 515 (2013).
92. Id. at 147 (citing McLeod, 278 Ga. at 244).
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the four factors above, concluded that the charge under the 9-1-1 is a
tax as a matter of law.93
1. Government Raising General Revenue
The Counties on appeal argued that the 9-1-1 Act restricted the
funds to specific communications costs listed in the statute rather than
generally fund the government to provide emergency services.94 The
statute provides,
“9-1-1 charge” means a contribution to the local government for the
9-1-1 service start-up equipment costs, subscriber notification costs,
addressing costs, billing costs, nonrecurring and recurring
installation, maintenance, service, and network charges of a service
supplier providing 9-1-1 service pursuant to this part, and costs
associated with the hiring, training, and compensating of dispatchers
employed by the local government to operate said 9-1-1 system at the
public safety answering points.95

From this perspective, the Counties argued that the charges were
fees for specific services rendered. The court responded by saying,
“[A]lthough the 911 charge raises funds for a dedicated purpose, it is
assessed based on the extent to which a person or business subscribes
to telephone service, not the extent to which a person can or in fact does
summon emergency services.”96 Furthermore, the court reasoned by
stating, “requiring a governmental charge to be deposited in a special
purpose fund does not make it a tax.” 97 Extending the counterargument
further, the court noted that a multitude of charges labeled as taxes are
limited to a particular purpose.98 Specifically, the Georgia Constitution
lays out exceptions to the rule that “no appropriation shall allocate to
any object the proceeds of any particular tax or fund or fund or a part or
percentage thereof.”99 Within the enumerated limitations listed, local
school taxes are presented as one of the funds for which the taxes are
deposited in a specific fund for a particular purpose.100

93. Id.
94. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 46-5-122(11) (2019); O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134(f);
§ 46-5-134.2(j)(4); see also O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134.2(j)(5) (2019).
95. O.C.G.A. § 46-5-122 (11).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Gunby, 214 Ga. at 20).
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting GA. CONST. art. III, § 9, para. 6).
100. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, para. 1(b).

O.C.G.A.
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2. Mandatory Requirement
The Counties argued “the 911 charge is not mandatory because
people may opt to receive telephone service and avoid the charge.” 101
However, the court noted that under the Counties’ interpretation of
avoiding the mandatory requirement, “income and sales taxes would
not be mandatory . . . [because] they could be avoided by not earning
income or making purchases.”102 The court elaborated by saying, “[W]e
have considered not whether someone may theoretically continue to live
a lawful existence without using a particular service at all, but whether
someone may obtain that service by way of an alternate route that
avoids paying the charge.”103 The court stressed this difference by
recalling the McLeod and Luke cases.104 In McLeod, because the
property owners could create and maintain their own private
stormwater management systems, the utility charge was not a tax. 105
Likewise, in Luke, the storage tank owner could have provided evidence
showing financial responsibility (as required by the statute) other than
participating in the underground storage tank trust fund. 106 Here,
individuals who own telephones cannot opt out of emergency services
even if they subscribe to an alternative phone service.107 Thus, the
charge under the Act is mandatory.108
3. Relationship Between the Payer’s Contribution and
Burden on Government
The court next insisted on illuminating the relationship between the
taxpayers’ obligation to pay the charge and the burden each telephone
user places on the emergency system. 109 If a relationship existed
between the taxpayer and the government to provide emergency
services for that individual, then nothing more would exist other than
compensation for services rendered—in other words, a fee. However,
because the emergency services were uniformly applied to all citizens in
the state, it was a tax. To extend this reasoning a little bit further, the
court, relying on the T-Mobile decision, noted that visitors who came to
the state could easily dial 9-1-1 and request emergency services on a
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103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 148.
Id. at 148 n.10.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
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phone, even though that individual was not subject to the charge under
the Act.110 Moreover, individuals who have phones could pay the charge
for years on end and never once summon emergency services, while
other people may need to call emergency services on a regular basis. 111
Because no relationship exists between the taxpayers and the
government regarding an obligation to provide services, the charge was
a tax.112
4. No Special Benefit to the Payer
The Counties argued on appeal that emergency services vary from
county to county.113 Primarily, the Counties argued that individuals
who don’t posses a cell phone or landline within one of the counties are
unable to take advantage of the so-called “enhanced” services, like a
dispatcher knowing the exact location of the caller immediately. 114 In
essence, the Counties provided that visitors or individuals that do not
reside in one of the Counties’ service areas are at a disadvantage
because they do not receive the same benefit as those who pay the 9-1-1
charge.115 To counter, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that the court
of appeals incorrectly framed the issue.116 The court explained that at
the time that litigation ensued, the maximum amount that any
telephone user in the state would pay was $1.50, regardless of the
quality of service provided in a given county.117 Furthermore, the Act
provides that the charge “must be uniform” and “may not vary
according to the type of telephone service used.”118 In conclusion, the
court relied on Bay Area, because in that case even though the local
government elected to provide “enhanced” emergency services
(automatic location identification), the 9-1-1 charge was still considered
a tax.119 Ultimately, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals on
this issue and held that there was no special benefit received by those
who paid the 9-1-1 charge.120
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A § 46-5-134(a)(1)(A)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 46-5-133(a)).
Id. (citing Bay Area, 162 Cal. App. 4th 686, 691, 699).
Id.
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B. Absent Express Language in the Statute, the Counties Cannot Recover
The Counties argued on appeal that “even if the 911 charge is
considered a tax, the Counties do not need express statutory
authorization to recover the charge in a tort action.”121 Further, the
Counties stated that they could enforce Bellsouth’s duty to collect the
funds because they were not trying to “levy taxes” on the service
subscribers.122 The court held that the Counties were wrong.123
The court began its analysis with the influential case of McCulloch v.
Maryland124 by saying, “The power to tax is the power to destroy.” 125
Appropriately, the court noted the power, which rests with the
government to collect and levy taxes, is so great that statutes that are
enacted by the legislature can only appropriately permit this power. 126
The structure of the separation of powers “preserves liberty because
legislators are accountable to the people more directly than bureaucrats
and judges.”127 In light of the rationale before the court, it concluded,
“Taxes cannot be collected through a court action absent some specific
legislative provision authorizing such an action.” 128
Here, the 9-1-1 Act never provides any express authorization for the
Counties to recover from Bellsouth or any service provider directly. 129
When these lawsuits were originally filed, the Act provided:
“[a] collection action may be initiated by the local government that
imposed” the 911 charges, but described only the “telephone
subscriber” as “liable” for the charge and provided that “[a] service
supplier shall have no obligation to take any legal action to enforce
the collection of the” charge.130

This means that the Counties could not directly force Bellsouth or
other service providers to collect the funds that they allegedly failed to
collect under the Act. Thus, the court concluded that if the charge under
the 9-1-1 Act is in fact a tax (which it held) then the Counties “must
have express statutory authorization to collect it through this action.” 131
121.
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123.
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125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 153.
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However, as the court showed, there was no express statutory
authorization and the court would not provide a remedy that
contradicted the legislature.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In light of the court’s decision, a number of various points need to be
addressed going forward considering the relationship between the
counties and service providers. Specifically, the 9-1-1 Act does not
penalize the service providers for failing to remit funds to the counties.
Counties and municipalities need a game plan, in light of this decision,
to ensure the service providers are distributing all of the funds.
One avenue counties could pursue is to negotiate a private contract
with the service providers that expressly states that the service
providers will be liable to the counties directly for the funds the service
provider fails to collect. Counties need a way to guarantee their money
and a right of action so the counties can pursue a claim against the
companies if they fail to remit the funds. By entering into a private
contract, counties could substitute a right of action against the service
providers that the Act fails to implement. This way, counties could
guarantee their money that is owed to them. However, after this
decision, it seems highly unlikely that any attorney would enter into a
private contract that will put the company they represent on the hook
for funds it fails to collect.
As mentioned above by the Georgia Supreme Court, the statute
provides that the service subscribers alone are liable to the counties and
the service providers cannot enforce a collection action against them—
the counties are responsible. Because the statute does not provide
express statutory authorization for counties or local governments to
pursue an action against the service providers for tort or common law
remedies such as fraud and negligence, lower courts will be hesitant to
provide equitable remedies where the statute does not expressly give
one. This decision means that Cobb and Gwinnett Counties are roughly
$38 million dollars out of pocket. As a result, Cobb and Gwinnett
Counties must find space in their budget to allocate funds to maintain
effective emergency services for their citizens.
What is more troubling about the setup of the 9-1-1 Act is that
counties are paying the service providers a small fee to bill, collect, and
remit the funds. However, as in this case, the Counties are alleging that
the service providers failed to collect the charges from the individual
service subscribers. In essence, why should the Counties pay the service
providers if the service providers are negligent in their billing and
collecting of funds? One would think that the General Assembly would
include a right of action against the service providers in the event that

[7] TAXATIONCASENOTE FINAL - CP (DO NOT DELETE)

692

MERCER LAW REVIEW

3/11/2020 10:36 AM

[Vol. 71

they fail to bill and collect correctly. The legislature precisely did not
include any sort of action or procedure by which counties and local
governments could pursue a collection action against the service
providers. In the approaching months and years, we will hopefully see
revisions to the 9-1-1 Act regarding a specific collection action against
service providers. Legislation along these lines would be appropriate
and would allow the counties to directly access more money, given that
the service providers are the ones in charge of collecting the funds from
the people.
Too many lives are on the line requiring medical emergency
assistance each and every day. Governments need adequate resources,
numerous staff, and reliable equipment to carry out their duties to meet
the needs of the citizens. If counties and local governments cannot get
the necessary funding, due to the negligence of collecting funds from
service providers under the Act, then people could lose their jobs and
others, possibly their lives. The Bellsouth decision has huge
ramifications that play a role in all of our lives beyond the legal
profession.

Davis Lackey

